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1 INTRODUCTION
The recent crisis in Libya and the imminent oil supply shortage as well as high energy 
price  fluctuations  in  the  past  years  elucidate  that  energy  security  is  becoming  just  as 
important as efficiency and sustainability of energy production. This was already stressed 
in a study by the Bundeswehr Transformation Centre of the German Federal Ministry of 
Defence  (ZTB,  2010),  which  recognized  that  fossil  fuels,  especially  oil,  are  not  only 
necessary for a functioning of the global economy, but also for strategic issues. While the 
World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2010) as well as many others expect world oil production 
paths that are able to meet world oil demand in the coming decade, the discussion about 
peak  oil  today  shows  that  these  projections  might  be  too  optimistic. When  comparing 
projections of world-wide oil supply of LBST (2010), which assumes that oil production 
has recently peaked, to projections of oil demand from e.g. the reference scenario of the 
WEO  (IEA,  2009),  it  becomes  obvious  that  it  might  well  be  possible  that  oil  supply 
shortages arise and grow over the next decade. This would mean, given the IEA oil prices, 
oil supply will not match oil demand.
Given that this is the case, the paper at hand presents results of a model-based scenario 
analysis  on  the  economic  implications  in  the  next  decade  of  an  oil  peak  today  and 
significantly decreasing oil production in the coming years. For that the extraction paths of 
oil  and  other  fossil  fuels  given  in  LBST  (2010)  are  implemented  in  the  global 
macroeconomic  model  GINFORS.  Additionally,  the  scenarios  incorporate  different 
technological  potentials  for  energy  efficiency  and  renewable  energy,  which  cannot  be 
forecast using econometric methods. GINFORS then endogenously determines world-wide 
energy  demand  and  energy  prices.  In  modelling  terms  this  means  that  the  oil  price  is 
increased until global oil demand equals global oil supply. The resulting oil price is by no 
means to be understood as the most likely oil price development. This exercise should 
rather be understood as an if-then-analysis in a research area that still needs extensive 
explorations.  Given  the  assumption  of  a  fixed  medium  term  oil  supply,  the  effects 
described in the following might be too strong.
The next section reviews the literature on economic effects of oil price changes. The 
GINFORS model, the implementation of the fossil fuel production paths in the model and 
the scenarios are described in section 3. Section 4 describes the macroeconomic effects on 
a  country level  and  sectoral  effects  for  selected  countries.  Section  5  gives  some 
conclusions of the discussion..
2 MACROECONOMIC OIL PRICE EFFECTS
Modelling the macroeconomic effects of decreasing oil supply in GINFORS is done via 
matching global oil demand to global supply by adjusting the oil price. As there exists very 
little literature on direct macroeconomic effects of oil shortages and the oil shortage is 
modelled via increasing oil prices, the effects we will see in this exercise correspond to 
macroeconomic oil price effects. For an extensive literature review the interested reader is 
referred to Hamilton (2005) and Kilian (2007).gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
© GWS mbH 2011 2
2.1 QUANTITATIVE EFFECTS OF OIL PRODUCTION DECREASES OR PRICE INCREASES
According to Jones et al. (2004) the effects of oil price shocks are difficult to model at 
the aggregated macroeconomic level, i.e. GDP. Most suitable are sectorally disaggregated 
econometric  models,  as  for  example  vector-autoregressive  (VAR)  or  vector-error-
correction (VEC) models, or models such as the MULTIMOD model of the IMF or the 
INTERLINK model of the OECD. They give a short overview of these types of models 
and  shortly  summarize  the  findings  about  the  oil  price  shock  effect  on  the  American 
economy. The different studies show a rather minor short run economic impact of oil price 
shocks. The literature on quantitative oil price effects can be roughly divided into two 
strands: one uses some form of theoretical or applied economic or econometric model to 
estimate the absolute effects on production and consumption. The other also makes use of 
models, but rather than reporting absolute effects they estimate short and long run oil price 
elasticities.
Jiménez-Rodríguez  (2008)  belongs  to  the  first  strand  of  literature  and  analyzes  the 
effect  of  an  increasing  oil  price  on  different  sectors  in  six  OECD  countries  (France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, US and UK) using a VAR model. The model is based on monthly 
data of eight industrial sectors and the total industry sector. He comes to the result that the 
negative shocks of a unit price increase of oil are higher in the US and UK compared with 
the other countries. The sectoral effects depend on the corresponding oil intensity. The 
average effects for the total industry sector in the different countries are displayed in row 3 
of table 1.
Table 1: Macroeconomic oil price effects in the literature
Source Oil price increase Economic 
effect
DE NL FR IT UK USA JP CN RU OPEC CA
1 Korhnoen & 
Ledyaeva 
(2010)
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Unit shock 40 month
Industry sector
-0,05 -- -0,06 -0,07 -0,13 -0,15 -- -- -- -- --
4 OECD 
(2004)
Increase from 32 







-- -- -- --
5 wiiw (2008) Increase by 10 USD nach 2 Jahren -- -0,50% -- -- -- -- --
6 Gupta 
(2008)
Oil-vulnarability index 0,44 0,55 0,45 0,55 -- 0,37 0,51 0,66 -- -- --
Euro-Raum:  -0.5% 
-0.35%
EU 27: -0.4%
The  Vienna  Institute  for  International  Economic  Studies  (wiiw,  2008)  analyzes  the 
effects on the European and American economies of a one time increase of the oil price of 
10 USD/barrel. In this simulation, the highest negative economic effects occur within the 
first two years after the price increase. The cumulative GDP loss in the US is 0.5% and in 
the EU27 0.4% of GDP after the second year, though the differences within the EU are 
quite large as a result of large differences in the energy intensity of production. The New 
Member States (NMS) are therefore more strongly affected than the Northern and Western
European countries. The effect on the price level can be altered by adapting appropriate 
monetary policy measures. Still the simulation runs show that the effect is strongest in the gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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second year following the price increase. Induced inflation at that time is 0.3 percentage 
points on average in the EU27 and 0.5 percentage points in the US.
wiiw  (2003) additionally  show  that  the  oil  price  increase  has  implications  for  trade 
balances. The effect on the European trade balance is twofold: trade surplus in non-energy 
goods as well as trade deficit in energy goods both increase. They find that 86% of this 
increase is a direct consequence of the price increase. To model the bilateral trade effects 
more explicitly the authors conducted a second simulation in which the world market oil 
price increases from 25 to 60 EUR/barrel. Table 2.1 on p. 14 in wiiw (2008) shows that the
EU reduces imports from all trading partners displayed there and expands exports to all 
countries but Japan. Japan reduces its imports as well, while China’s imports from the 
other countries still grow between 3.5% and 6% per year. A general conclusion is that the 
relatively energy-efficient industries (be it countries or economic sectors) grow whereas 
those  that  are  relatively  energy-inefficient  shrink.  A  long-term  effect  of  the  oil  price 
increase is a lower oil-intensity in all sectors and countries.
Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010) use a system of simultaneous reduced form bilateral 
export functions to analyze direct and indirect effects of a 50% increase in the oil price. 
Indirect effects are for example additional import demand in oil-exporting countries that 
has a positive effect on exports of oil-importing countries. The data covers Russia and 
Canada  as  oil-exporting  countries  and  their  most  important  trading  partners  Germany, 
Italy, The Netherlands, China, US, Switzerland, Finland, Belgium, France, and Japan that
are all net-importers of oil, and the UK. Two very important trading partners of Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan, could not be included in the analysis due to a lack of data. The 
impulse response functions give the cumulative GDP effects of the oil price increase after 
one and five years. For the two oil exporting countries Russia and Canada the size of these 
effects differ substantially. While they were +6.8% and +6.0% in Russia respectively, they 
were only +1.5% and +0.9% for Canada. This difference is due to the difference in the 
share of energy-related exports, which are only 15% of total exports in Canada while they 
constitute  60%  of  total  exports  of  Russia.  Due  to  indirect  effects,  France,  Italy,  The 
Netherlands and Belgium seem to benefit from the oil price shock, while in Germany both 
the direct and the indirect effects are negative in the medium run, though they are not very 
strong in total with -0.8% of GDP. The sign of the indirect effects depends on the ratio of 
export shares of winners of the oil price shock to exports shares of the loser of the oil price 
shock. If a country mainly exports to countries that benefit from an oil price increase then 
the indirect effects tend to be positive and vice versa.
The GINFORS model
1 has already been used for a similar exercise in Lutz and Meyer 
(2009), where the oil price in the simulation increased from 130 USD per barrel in 2010 to 
150 USD per barrel in 2020, compared to an increase from 80 to 100 USD per barrel in the 
baseline  scenario.  While  the  GINFORS  model  gives  results  for  50  countries  and  two 
regions they mainly focus their analysis on the impact of the increased oil price on German 
industrial sectors. Still, they compare GDP effects in 2020 across countries and find that 
1 Global INterindustry FORcasting System is the model that is applied in the scenario analysis of this paper 
and it is explained in further detail in section 3.gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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the  effect  on  German  GDP  (-0.2%)  is  by  far  the  smallest  among  the  oil  importing 
countries.  The  effects  on  GDP  of  the  US,  China  and  Japan  in  the  high  energy  price 
scenario are significantly higher with -1.6%, -2.6% and -3.8%, respectively. Even in the 
UK, which is still a net oil exporter, the negative impact on the country’s GDP (-0.7%) is 
stronger than in Germany in this simulation. The relatively modest effect on the German 
economy  is  explained  by  positive  indirect  effects  as  the  shares  of  the  oil  exporting 
countries in German exports are rather high. For the two biggest oil exporters OPEC and 
Russia GDP increases by 17.1% and 10.4% compared to the baseline scenario.
OECD (2004) not only analyzes the economic effects of an oil price increase but also 
factors that influence the oil price and possible policy measures after an oil price increase.
Given a business-as-usual energy consumption, it is expected that in 2030 fossil fuels will 
still be 90% of total primary energy consumption, with the transport sector requiring the 
highest  share.  Using  the  global  Interlink  model  to describe  the  effects  of  a  permanent 
increase in the oil price from 32 to 47 USD per barrel in 2004. OECD (2004) find that 
there are only minor macroeconomic effects in the short run. GDP losses in the OECD 
countries amount to 0.45% in the two following years (US: -0.45% and -0.5%; Japan: -
0.6% in both years; EURO-region: 0.5% and -0.35%), inflation increases by 0.6% and 
0.25%  assuming  constant  real  interest  rates.  When  assuming  constant  nominal  interest 
rates, the GDP effects are even smaller. 
In addition to their own analysis, OECD (2004) reviews studies that estimated price and 
income  elasticities  of  oil  demand.  Price  elasticities  are  between  -0.1  and  -0.64,  which 
confirms the findings below. Elasticities are generally lower in emerging economies than 
in  OECD  countries.  Kilian  (2007)  for  example  estimates  price  elasticities  of  US 
consumption and investment to be about -0.15 to -0.16, respectively. Price elasticities for 
energy demand are significantly higher: for heating oil and coal they are -1.47, for gasoline 
-0.48 and for natural gas -0.33. Electricity demand though has an oil price elasticity of only 
-0.15. 
Fattouh (2007) also reviews literature on price and income elasticities of oil demand and 
comes  to  similar  conclusions as  Kilian  and  the  OECD.  The  short  run  elasticities  are 
between -0.03 and -0.09 and the long run elasticities somewhat larger between -0.03 and -
0.64,  depending  on  time  frame  and  region.  He  also  confirms  the  finding  that  price 
elasticities in industrialized countries are higher than in emerging economies while the 
opposite is true for income elasticities. Hamilton (2008) confirms these findings with own 
calculations and a literature review. One of his main conclusions is that in general long run 
elasticities are about three times the short run elasticities.
Gupta (2008) uses a very different approach to possible oil price effects: he constructs 
an oil vulnerability index which is a combination of market risk and supply risk indicators. 
He  finds  that  from  the  26  emerging  and  industrialised  countries  that  he  analyses  the 
Philippines, Korea and India are the most vulnerable and Austria, France, Germany, the 
US, Sweden and Australia are the least vulnerable countries.
2.2 TRANSMISSION CHANNELS
Kilian  (2007)  not  only  calculates  oil  price elasticities,  but  also  analyzes  possible 
transmission  channels  distinguishing  between  supply-side  and  demand-side.  The  main gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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supply-side channel is higher input costs, be it due to cost increases in production factors, 
e.g. oil itself in the chemical industry, higher energy costs for the remaining industries or 
simply higher transportation costs. Higher production costs can only be partly passed on to 
consumers so that industry profits are lowered.
There are five different demand-side channels. First, there is the discretionary income 
effect, i.e. higher energy costs lower a households’ disposable income after having paid for 
energy. The “precautionary savings” channel has the same effect as higher savings. It goes
hand  in  hand  with  lower  disposable  income  and  hence  lower  consumption.  The  third 
channel “uncertainty effect” also results in lower consumption as fluctuating/increasing 
energy prices may lead people to “postpone irreversible purchases of consumer durables”
(Kilian, 2007, p. 10). The fourth effect is the “operating cost effect” which describes the 
decrease in purchases of energy intensive durable goods such as cars. The last channel 
Kilian (2007) describes deals with the indirect effects through changing consumption and 
investment patterns. These imply not only redistribution within but also between sectors. 
GINFORS is able to reproduce the supply side channel of higher input and transportation 
costs, the income effects, indirect effects and substitution effects.
Substitution effects relate to a possible replacement of oil by other energy carriers. The 
literature mainly deals with fossil fuel substitution neglecting the possibility to substitute 
renewable energies for oil. Stern (2009) examines the substitution effects between oil, gas, 
coal and electricity in a meta-analysis based on 46 studies published between 1979 and 
2009. He finds that the substitution effects between oil and gas are less than one, between 
coal and gas larger than one and the remaining about one. The substitution effects seem to 
be  higher  the  more  observations  there  are,  the  higher  the  sectoral  aggregation  and  the 
higher the countries’ GPD is. Söderholm (1999) additionally stresses the importance of 
distinguishing between short run and long run effects, as modification of a given power 
plant  fleet  is  not  easily  possible  in  the  short  run.  He  also  suggests  that  short  run 
substitutions  are  mainly  cost  induced  whereas  the  long  run  energy  mix  is  strongly 
influenced by policy makers.
2.3 OIL PRICE FORMATION
Until now, only the effects of changing oil prices on the economy and how they are 
transmitted through the economy have been described. The oil price itself though is not 
exogenously given to the world but develops over time depending on different demand and 
supply side factors as explained below. There exist different approaches to modelling the 
oil price. Fattouh (2007) distinguishes between “economics of scarce resources”, supply-
and-demand systems and what he calls the “informal approach”. Hamilton (2008) also 
considers  supply-and-demand  systems,  but  then  further  suggests  a  model  of  dynamic 
interactions between storage, futures and scarcity rent and statistical analysis. GINFORS 
includes equations that can be used to determine the equilibrium between oil supply, oil 
demand and their determinants such as economic growth, oil price, and oil reserves.
On the demand side, price and income elasticities are most important for the formation 
of the oil price. In GINFORS, sectoral oil demand is econometrically estimated depending 
on  sectoral  production  and  absolute  and  relative  oil  prices.  When  interpreting  the 
elasticities we have to keep in mind that the share of the oil price in the price of petroleum 
products varies across countries depending on taxes and subsidies. While taxes on gasoline gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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are high in most industrialised countries, the petroleum products in oil producing countries 
are often heavily subsidized and therefore distort market effects. IEA estimates world wide 
subsidies on oil to amount to 312 billion USD in 2009 and 558 billion USD in 2008. These 
considerations show that oil consumers in different countries are differently exposed to 
changes in the price of crude oil. 
Price elasticities are not only important on the demand side, but also on the supply side. 
However, short run elasticities are generally very small depending on production capacity 
utilization as building new production capacities is time and capital intensive. In addition, 
production costs tend to increase more than proportionally with the increasing exploitation 
of oil fields. Hamilton (2008) discovers in a statistical analysis that there exist no reliable 
macroeconomic indicators for oil price predictions. He concludes that the oil price is a 
random walk with drift, i.e. that it is the best predictor for itself. According to his analysis, 
given  an  oil  price  of  115  USD  per  barrel  today  the  oil  price  in  four  years  will  be 
somewhere between 34 USD and 391 USD per barrel, which is quite a large bandwidth.
Due to the cartel-like nature of oil production, OPEC, which owns about three quarters 
of global (conventional) oil reserves and controls 40% of global oil production (Gupta, 
2008), has a major influence on the oil market and can more or less determine total oil 
production quantities and price. According to neo-classical assumption the marginal price 
should  equal  marginal  costs  for  cartels.  Additionally,  the  Hotelling  rule  for  scarce 
resources could also apply to oil. But, according to Hamilton (2008), there is no historical 
evidence that either of these economic theories holds for the oil market. Though, it is still 
true that OPEC has a significant influence on the oil market and hence also on the oil price.
3 MODEL AND SCENARIO SETUP
Assuming that oil production just peaked, i.e. in 2010, we calculate two scenarios that 
can be compared to the baseline scenario in which we assume the oil production path given 
in the IEA WEO 2009. According to this scenario in IEA (2009) world oil supply will 
exceed world oil demand, so that there will not be an oil shortage until at least 2030. The 
two scenarios “Peak Oil” and “Peak Oil Eff/RE” assume that oil production has peaked 
and declines over the next decade. “Peak Oil Eff/RE” additionally assumes massive energy 
efficiency improvements and increased use of renewable resources on a global level.
3.1 GLOBAL INTERINDUSTRY FORECASTING SYSTEM
To  model  the  macroeconomic  effects  of  this  oil  shortage  we  use  the  sectorally 
disaggregated  global  energy-environment-economy  model  GINFORS.  It  combines 
econometric-statistical  analysis  with  input-output  analysis  embedded  in  a  complete 
macroeconomic framework ensuring the accounting identities of the system of national 
accounts.  GINFORS  has  recently  been  applied  to  various  economic  questions,  ranging 
from  an  European  environmental  tax  reform  (Lutz  and  Meyer  2010,  Ekins  and  Speck 
2011) and environmental and economic effects of Post-Kyoto regimes (Lutz and Meyer 
2009b) to the impact of higher energy prices through international trade (Lutz and Meyer 
2009a). A detailed description of GINFORS can be found in Lutz et al. (2010) or Lutz and 
Meyer (2009a/b, 2010).gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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3.2 SCENARIOS
The scenarios differ according to world oil supply and demand. The baseline scenario is 
based on the reference scenario of the IEA WEO 2009. World energy demand is steadily 
increasing, mainly due to increasing demand in the emerging economies. There are no 
supply shortages until 2030. The price for crude oil increases to 100 USD2009 in 2020 and 
115 USD2009 in 2030. The baseline scenario in the most recent WEO (IEA, 2010) more or 
less complies with this one, but puts slightly more emphasis on a possible influence of 
global climate change action on global energy demand and hence on energy prices. 
Energy demand in scenario “Peak Oil” is equivalent to energy demand in the baseline. 
For the supply side though it is assumed that world oil production has peaked and will 
significantly decline over the next decade until 2020, so that global oil supply does no 
longer match global oil demand as shown in figure 1. This shortage can not only occur due 
to shrinking oil production but also due to political disruptions or military disputes as 
started in early 2011 in the MENA (Middle-East North-African) countries.
For the model we assume that world oil production is price independent in the medium 
term  and  decreasing  after  2010.  The  assumption  of  a  fixed  oil  supply  in  the  short  to 
medium  term  is  feasible  because  of  limited  production  expansion  possibilities  due  to 
necessary time and capital consuming investments. In the long run oil production is less 
price  inelastic,  which  should  then  be  considered.  Price  elasticities  of  oil  demand  are 
estimated in the model. Using these results, it is possible to increase the oil price until 
global oil demand has dropped so that it equals global oil supply. The implication of the 
price-inelastic demand is a strong increase of the price for crude oil after 2015.
The third scenario “Peak Oil Eff/RE” also assumes peak oil, but uses the 450 ppm-
scenario  of  the  IEA  WEO  (2009)  as  a  guideline  for  demand  side  development.  The 
assumptions are increased energy efficiency and extended use of renewables.
4 RESULTS
The results for the three scenarios have all been calculated using the same model. The 
differences between the scenario specifications have been explained above. The remaining 
assumptions are the same in all three scenarios so that the differences in the results must be 
due to the different assumptions concerning oil supply and demand. The development as 
projected in this analysis should be interpreted using if-then-statements and should be seen 
relative to each other and not in absolute terms. The three central questions that can be 
answered with this analysis are
1) What are the effects of an oil supply shortage when demand is developing as in the
business-as-usual case? (Comparison of “Peak Oil” scenario with baseline)
2) What are the effects of a shrinking global oil production with a contemporaneous 
global climate protection action, i.e. improved energy efficiency and expansion of 
renewable energy? (Comparison of scenarios “Peak Oil Eff/RE” and “Peak Oil”)gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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3) What are the advantages of a global climate protection action in the case of declining 
oil supply compared to a continuing business-as-usual development? (comparison of 
“Peak Oil Eff/RE” with baseline)
The main results are the change in oil price, which is endogenously determined within 
the demand-supply-system, the change in global energy consumption and macroeconomic 
effects on country level.
4.1 OIL PRICE
A declining oil supply in the next decade combined with an increased demand for oil
until 2020 as expected in the baseline scenario leads to a strong increase in the oil price 
that adjusts oil demand until it equals oil supply.  In scenario “Peak  Oil”, without any 
efficiency improvements or increased use of renewables, the supply shortage will become 
apparent as from 2015 onwards when the oil price starts to strongly increase up to 600 
USD per barrel in 2020 (see figure 2). This is about 420 USD in constant prices using the 
German price index; less in other countries due to higher inflation expectations. The IEA 
(2009) expects the oil price in 2020 to be somewhere between 85 and 120 USD per barrel 
in constant prices.
The oil price necessary to equalize demand and supply in 2020 in scenario “Peak Oil 
Eff/RE” is only half of the price in the “Peak Oil” scenario, i.e. 300 USD in current or 
about 210 USD per barrel in constant prices, which is still substantially higher than the all-
time high of 150 USD per barrel in 2008.
The main share of total oil produced is used in the transport sector, which is known to 
be rather price inelastic. Hence, an increase in the oil price only results in small changes in 
demand. Short and medium run substitution possibilities and energy efficiency increases 
are limited because of the long life span of vehicles, planes etc. In addition to this limited 
reduction in demand, the subsidies in the oil producing countries on oil products increase 
with the oil price, so that demand in these countries is not affected. This in turn means that 
the decrease in global oil demand is completely borne by the oil importing countries. IEA 
(2010)  estimates  that  by  merely  abolishing  these  subsidies,  global  primary  energy 
consumption would drop by 5%.
The increase in the price of crude oil also has effects on the prices of other goods 
subject to their direct and indirect oil dependence (see figure 6 for sectoral results for 
Germany). GINFORS is able to capture these effects as it models global inter-industry 
dependencies through the use of input-output and bilateral trade models. The sensitivity of 
prices of petroleum products additionally depends on the share of the price of crude oil in 
relation  to  the  share  of  taxes,  subsidies,  production  costs,  etc.  and  exchange  rate 
fluctuations,  as  crude  oil  is  traded  in  USD.  The  effect  on  coal  and  gas  prices  is  not 
modelled in GINFORS. Even though some relation between fossil fuel prices on global 
markets exist because they are substitutes for each other, this relation seems to weaken in 
recent years or at least change with changing supply structures. This can, for example, be 
seen from the divergence of oil and gas prices especially in North America, but also in 
Europe. The scenarios “Peak Oil” and “Peak Oil Eff/RE” use the simplifying assumption 
that import prices of coal and gas do not change.gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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4.2 ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND
Figure 3 shows that energy demand for all energy carriers strongly increases until 2020 
in  the  baseline. In  the  two  alternative  scenarios  though  demand  for  fossil  fuels  is gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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significantly lower in 2020 as can be seen from the two bars on the right in figure 3. The 
increase in the demand for gas in “Peak Oil” partly absorbs the decrease in oil demand. 
The lower use of coal though is due to lower global economic activity, especially in China. 
Biomass, other renewables as well as nuclear energy only play a minor role in the “Peak 
Oil” scenario until 2020. The efficiency effect and the expansion in the use of renewables 
are clearly visible in the energy mix in “Peak Oil Eff/RE” in 2020. Global demand for 
fossil fuels is significantly lower than in the other two scenarios.
Global oil production for scenarios “Peak Oil” and “Peak Oil Eff/RE” is displayed in 
figure 4. Production declines in all regions, while relative production shares hardly change.
4.3 MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS
For the OECD countries GINFORS models production, prices and employment for 41 
economic  sectors.  Macroeconomic  aggregates  such  as  GDP,  private  and  government 
consumption,  investments,  imports,  exports,  total  employment,  price  index  or  hourly 
wages are available for all countries and regions.


















The substantial increase in the oil price in “Peak Oil” has a strong influence on the 
economic development of individual countries. The global effect is even comparable to the 
effect of the financial and economic crises of 2008/2009. Oil exporting countries though gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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strongly benefit from the increased oil price: the GDP of both Russia and the OPEC is by 
about 35% higher in “Peak Oil” than in the baseline (see figure 5) even though physical oil 
exports shrink. This decrease though is more than levelled by the price increase. Even 
though the UK and the US will be net importers of oil in 2020, due to their domestic oil 
production their GDP loss in “Peak Oil” compared to the baseline is substantially lower 
than the GDP loss in countries such as France, Japan or India that, if at all, have only little 
domestic  oil  production.  China  however,  which  is  ranked  among  the  top  15  countries 
according to proven oil reserves (IEA, 2010), is also highly negatively affected. This is due 
to  the  strong  increase  in  energy  demand,  which  exceeds  by  far  possible  domestic 
production increases. Still, GDP growth rates remain positive in all countries but Japan. 
Efficiency measures and increased use of renewables as modelled in “Peak Oil Eff/RE” 
could  significantly  lower  the  oil  price  increase  and  hence  also  the  negative  economic 
impacts.  Overall,  the  economic  influence  of  the  oil  exporting  countries  grows  in  both 
scenarios (Peak Oil and Peak Oil Eff/RE) whereas the other countries’ influence on the 
world market shrinks.
4.3.2 DETAILED RESULTS FOR GERMANY
The effect on the German economy is comparably low. This can be explained by the 
positive  indirect  effects  through  trade  with  oil  exporting  countries  and  Germany’s
production  of  high  quality  energy  efficient  export  goods.  The  results  for  some 
macroeconomic indicators are displayed in table 2. The effects on the different components 
of the GDP vary. Consumption significantly decreases while investments hardly change. 
Exports decrease less than imports, which can be interpreted as an increase in international 
competitiveness. Wages increase slower than the costs of living so that employment in 
“Peak Oil” is even larger than in the baseline.
However, we would like to stress that these results need to be interpreted with care as an 
oil price increase of the size assumed in scenario “Peak Oil” has never been experienced 
before and reaction parameters that are estimated based on historical relations might no 
longer be valid. Small changes in the model parameters though can substantially alter the 
results.
Table 2: Macroeconomic indicators for Germany – “Peak Oil” compared to baseline
in % total
GDP (billion Euro 2005) -2.76 -67.3
Household consumption expenditures -8.42 -90.2




Employment (in 1000) 0.57 213.0
Consumer price index (1995 = 100) 26.36 37.4
Average hourly wage in Euro 17.02 27.9
Deviation from baselinegws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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Figure 6 shows the effects of the oil price increase on the sectoral level in Germany.
Price increases are transmitted via global production chains and are strongest for energy 
and petroleum products, transport and electricity generation. In the remaining sectors the 
price difference between “Peak Oil” and baseline is between 20% and 60%, for the service 
sectors lower than for the manufacturing sectors. The wage-price mechanism in GINFORS 
is modelled endogenously: wages increase with increasing production prices, which then 
again increase in the following year due to higher labour costs. These large price increases 
are possible because GINFORS assumes non-restrictive monetary policies of the central 
banks. If these were more restrictive, the negative effects would be even higher. gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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The effect of an oil price increase on sectoral production is diverse (figure 7). While it is 
negative for the service sectors due to lower demand, most manufacturing sectors benefit 
in real terms.
4.3.3 ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS
The  relatively  small  effects  in  Germany  can  be  explained  by  a  number  of  factors.
Germany  has  very  high  oil  productivity;  it  needs  about  half  as  much  oil  per  unit  of 
production as the US industry and only one quarter the amount of China (compare figure 
8). This high oil productivity will be even further improved through political measures 
such as the energy concept that the government decided upon in 2010 and the general trend 
to a decreasing oil dependency in industry, commerce, trade, services and households. The 
problem that Germany shares with France, Japan, Korea and India is that they have no 
domestic oil reserves and therefore completely rely on imports of this good which is traded 
at very volatile prices. The US, UK, and China on the other hand do have some domestic 
oil production and hence do not depend that heavily on oil imports. Still, reducing oil 
consumption is easier for industrialized countries such as Germany than for the newly 
emerging economies India and China.
Figure 8: Oil productivity (GDP in billion USD2000/ oil usage in Mtoe) of selected 

















































































Purchasing power parities 2004
The  economic  structure  itself  and  trade  linkages  also  determine  the  macroeconomic 
effects. Does an economy have production and investment goods that are substitutes for 
oil? What is the share of the negatively affected sectors? To what extend are the trading 
partners affected by the oil price increase? Germany as a producer of high quality goods, 
for which transport costs are only of minor importance for international competitiveness, 
and  energy  efficient  investment  goods  has  a  good  position  in  case  of  “Peak  Oil”. gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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Moreover, the oil producing countries have a high share in German exports so that the 
indirect effects for Germany are positive.
Not only economic factors have an influence on the magnitude of the effects of the oil 
price increase, but also geographic factors. Generally, countries that are densely populated, 
have a  high  domestic  demand  and are  in close  proximity  to  export  markets  are  better 
protected against a strong increase in the oil price than other countries. This explains why 
the negative effects on Japan are higher in comparison to the European countries despite its 
rather high oil productivity.
Important factors that are not modelled in GINFORS are possible alternative transportation 
means, e.g. powerful electricity-based train networks, or a switch from petroleum-based 
cars to biofuel, electricity or LPG driven cars.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This  analysis  shows  possible  economic  effects  of  a  significant  drop  in  world  oil 
production  over  the  next  decade.  Assuming  that  global  demand  for  oil  and  petroleum 
products remains increasing, the oil price will increase sharply due to the price inelastic 
nature of the oil market in the short to medium run. Large fluctuations in the oil price occur 
for only small changes in supply and demand. This is also supported by findings in the 
literature and shows that the strong price fluctuations as experienced in the past years are 
quite possible. The oil shortage firstly and strongly affects the transport sector but then has 
indirect  effects  on  all  other  sectors  through  global  supply  chains.  The  medium  term
reactions to the oil shortage and corresponding substantial increase in the oil price of the 
global  energy  system  and  the  individual  sectors  are  energy  saving  and  substitution, 
lowering global energy demand. The global macroeconomic effects of an increase of the 
oil  price  as  high  as  modelled  here  are  comparable  to  the  effects  of  the  financial  and 
economic  crises  of  2008/2009.  Country-specific  effects  are  very  different  as  the  oil 
exporting  countries  gain  importance  in  the  global  economy  while  the  influence  of  the 
strong oil-importing economies of today decreases.
Comparing  scenarios  “Peak  Oil”  and  “Peak  Oil  Eff/RE”  shows  that  global  climate 
protection  actions  may  very  well  reduce  the  negative  economic  impacts  of  oil  supply 
shortages and associated strong increases in the oil price.
Note  that  GINFORS  is  only  able  to  display  effects  in  monetary  terms  and  that  the 
results depend on a variety of model assumptions. Actual real world outcomes also depend 
on a number of other – not easily modellable – factors, such as the price dependence of oil 
supply over time, especially with regard to unconventional oil fields, obstacles such as 
financing gaps or interests of national oil producers (as also noted by IEA, 2010, p. 125), 
long  run  oil  substitution  possibilities  and  their  cost  development  next  to  efficiency 
improvements, increased use of renewables, and potentials in the transport sector (biofuels, 
electricity, LPG, coal-to-liquids). The model only captures part of the oil price effects as 
described in the literature. When interpreting the results one should also consider that there 
are high uncertainties with regard to the future behaviour of economic agents, not only on 
the oil market, so that one possible extension of the research at hand will be a variety of 
sensitivity analyses.gws Discussion Paper 2011/3
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The reasons for the oil shortage, which in this paper is assumed to be peak oil, could as 
well  be  political  disruptions,  military  conflicts  or  terror  attacks  in  the  oil  producing 
countries. For the analysis of the macroeconomic effects though the actual source of the oil 
shortage and corresponding oil price increase does not matter. This analysis shows that not 
only the reduction in emissions but also fossil fuel shortage, especially oil shortage, and 
energy security are good reasons for global climate action programmes regarding increases 
in energy efficiency and further development of renewable energy sources. 
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